“Independent Persons” Rule It Is Acceptable For City Of London Councillors Like Ruby Sayed To Tell Lies

We have previously reported how the nine “independent persons” who are responsible for considering complaints against City council members for breaches of the code of conduct are not “independent” at all and have an unbroken record of dismissing complaints against establishment members and upholding them against establishment critics. Some of these “independent persons” recently caused scandal when they recommended, in near hysterical terms, that a leading establishment critic, Councillor Marianne Fredericks, be censured following a malicious and politically motivated complaint brought against her by Councillor Ruby Sayed. This scandal was compounded by the response of a majority of council members to that recommendation in a non-public debate, which we covered here.

In our coverage of the debate, we described how Sayed had told the council that “I made it very clear from the outset that I’m open to mediation and that offer remains”, but in answer to a question on her complaint form about whether she was willing to consider mediation, she had checked the box “no”. In fact, she showed no willingness to engage in mediation until after the “independent persons” had made their recommendation, and then only when the Chair of Policy and Resources (= leader of the council) and the Town Clerk pressed her. She thus misled members by saying something she knew was not true. In short, she lied to the council, and did so in a formal meeting on a serious matter.

Councillor Ruby Sayed 

A City worker who read our coverage of the debate made a formal complaint against Sayed for breach of the “honesty” principle of public life, which is enshrined in the members’ code of conduct.

In accordance with the complaints procedure, Sayed made a formal response, which we have seen and in which we discern the hand of Edward Lord. This response compounded Sayed’s original breach of the code of conduct by containing a number of untrue or irrelevant statements which were evidently designed to mislead or distract the assessment sub-panel of “independent persons” that was convened to consider the complaint.

The complainant wrote to the panel explaining why the statements in Sayed’s response were untrue or irrelevant. Sayed sent an email to the panel members on the morning of their meeting on 7/7/23. That email was never sent to the complainant, but – according to a member of the City Solicitor’s department – it refuted the complainant’s explanations without giving reasons.

The panel held its meeting in non-public session, apart from the first three minutes which can be seen here. Ten days later, the panel issued its written decision notice.

In that notice, it stated that it was satisfied that, “on the face of it”, Sayed had “made an inaccurate statement” to council members. It also accepted that a claim made in Sayed’s response was incorrect. It did not suggest that Sayed’s “inaccurate statement” to members was an honest mistake: the facts recorded in our report and not challenged in the complaint proceedings clearly indicate that she knew her statement was untrue when she made it. In plain English, she told a lie.

You would therefore expect the panel to rule that the complaint against Sayed for breaching the “honesty” principle of public life, which requires that “holders of public office should be truthful”, was admissible. Even a child could reach that conclusion.

Incredibly, the panel ruled that the complaint was not admissible.

Its reasons for dismissing the complaint were equally incredible. Here they are, in the panel’s own words:

“the panel considered that the obligation (in paragraph 1(g) of the Code) to be “truthful” needs to be understood in the context of Cllr Sayed’s right of freedom of expression and, in particular, the very strong protection afforded to the speech of elected representatives. That protection is especially important in this case because the statement which is the subject of this complaint was made during a debate in a formal meeting of the Court [of Common Council (= City council)].”

So the panel considered that one member telling a lie to other members in a formal meeting of the council could be justified by the liar’s “right of freedom of expression”. That has the effect of adding to the “honesty” principle of public life – that “holders of public life should be truthful” – the words “except when they are addressing the whole council in a formal meeting, in which case they can lie as much as they like”. 

The panel tried to justify this perverse reasoning by citing a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Lombardo v Malta. If you read that judgment, though, you will find that it addressed very different facts, and does not support the panel’s reasoning. The thrust of the judgment is that comments made in a political context which amount to value judgements must be tolerated even if untrue, as long as they have some or any factual basis. Even an untrue statement of fact will be tolerated if what was expressed was said in good faith and there was some reasonable (even if incorrect) factual basis for saying it.

The comment which Sayed made to council members was not spoken in a political context, nor was it a value judgment. It was made in the context of her own complaint against Councillor Fredericks, and was an attempt by Sayed to make herself appear more reasonable than she was in pursuing that complaint. Her comment had no factual basis and was not said in good faith.

The panel compounded its folly stating that if it had found that Sayed had breached the code of conduct in this case, that finding:

“could … exert a more general “chilling effect” on all members participating in debates in the Court. Therefore the Panel considered that only in cases of exceptional seriousness would such statements – even if inaccurate or untrue – breach the Code.”

So the panel considered that the basic requirement for a member to tell the truth in accordance with the “honesty” principle of public life, as enshrined in the code of conduct, could have a “chilling effect” on debate. That has the effect of turning the code of conduct into a liar’s charter. The panel did not explain how there could be a case of more “exceptional seriousness” than this one, which concerned a censure of a fellow member that had potential consequences for that member’s livelihood.

Finally, the panel tried to justify its acceptance of Sayed’s lying by saying:

“it seemed to the Panel unlikely that the Court was misled by Cllr Sayed’s statement”.

So the panel considered that “holders of public life should be truthful” except when they are addressing the whole council in a formal meeting, in which case they can lie as much as they like, as long as it is unlikely that members are misled by the lie.

Incidentally, the main reason for the panel thinking that members were unlikely to be misled by Sayed’s lie was that:

“It does not appear from the record of the debate in the Reclaim EC1 article that Cllr Sayed was challenged on this issue”.

Our report of the debate did not purport to be comprehensive. A verbatim transcript of the council’s own recording could have been provided at the hearing stage of the complaint, but the panel denied itself that opportunity by dismissing the complaint before it reached that stage.

Two of the three members of the panel – Miranda Carruthers Watt and Robert Coyle – had a particular incentive to dismiss the complaint, having both participated in dealing with the earlier complaint that Sayed had made against Fredericks, in which they overlooked obvious malice on the part of Sayed. Finding against Sayed in the present complaint would expose their previous lack of judgment.

If the City council does nothing about the latest decision by its “independent persons” to dismiss a complaint against an establishment councillor – in this case because they ruled that it was not a breach of the code of conduct for the councillor to tell a lie to the whole council in a formal meeting about a serious matter – the case for the council being morally corrupt is indisputable, and government intervention is urgently required.

The action needed by the council is simple: replace the “independent persons”, whose job description requires them to be “empathetic” to the council (i.e. biased in favour of establishment members), with a retired senior judge who:

– is not a mason;

– is not required to be “empathetic” to the council; and

– can be expected to apply the code of conduct without fear or favour.

The Council’s political leaders have reason to fear this solution. It will deprive them of both:

– protection for themselves and their supporters when they act improperly; and

– the ability to weaponise the complaints procedure against their critics within the council.

If they don’t implement this solution, however, they may find matters taken out of their hands altogether.

Notes

The header shows the three “independent persons” involved in this case: (from the left) Gary Rogers (Deputy Chair), Miranda Carruthers Watt (top), Robert Coyle (bottom). Below is a clearer screenshot from a second later that also shows the Principal Governance and Member Services Manager at City of London, who was acting as clerk for the meeting (left bottom) and is not responsible for the panel’s decisions.

The City council’s six other “independent persons”, who have all been involved in previous cases in which they have dismissed complaints against establishment members and upheld them against an establishment critic, are as follows: Amanda Orchard (Chair), Christine Fraser, Tom Ketteley, Rahul Sinha, Philip Thicknesse and Atiyyah Younis.